A Plea for Reality by Schotland, Roy A.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2009 
A Plea for Reality 
Roy A. Schotland 
Georgetown University Law Center, schotlan@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-98 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/679 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890605 
 
74 Mo. L. Rev. 507-529 (2009) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons 
 A Plea for Reality 
Roy A. Schotland1   
I. THE ENDLESS DEBATE ............................................................................. 508 
II. A REPLY TO ADVOCACY AT THE SYMPOSIUM .......................................... 512 
III.   ARE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS LIKE OTHER ELECTIONS, 
   SHOULD THEY BE? .................................................................................. 517 
IV.   THE LIVELY, THORNY PROBLEM OF RECUSAL BECAUSE 
 OF CAMPAIGN CONDUCT AND/OR CAMPAIGN FUNDING .......................... 519 
V.    REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ....................................................................... 523 
VI.   STEPS TO REDUCE THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS  OF 
  JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ............................................................................... 524 
VII.  HONORING FIFTEEN CHIEF JUSTICES ....................................................... 527 
 
Thank you for the privilege and the pleasure of joining you, in the best 
possible state for any discussion of judicial selection and blessedly at a dis-
tinguished law school.  For me, after twenty-five years of involvement in the 
judicial election scene and four weeks after retiring from teaching – but not, I 
hope, from continued involvement – this is a unique opportunity to share 
views, air questions, consider the ever-evolving changes and challenges, and 
speak bluntly on a few points.  I treasure the friendships I have built with 
others similarly involved, and I hope that my comments, some of which may 
seem unrestrained, are taken in the spirit that underlies them.  My plea for 
reality stems from the view that this subject suffers from much myth and 
much spin.  Myth matters when it differs from reality about where we are and 
  
 1. Professor Emeritus, Georgetown Univ. Law Center.  This will be my last 
article, after twenty-four years writing on this subject, which may explain the shame-
less citations to previous articles.  Preferring “reality” over myth and spin has been a 
constant.  See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial 
Elections, 35 IND. L. REV. 659 (2002); Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice 
in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election 
Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1250, 1254 (2008) (Afterword, Part C., 
Public Campaign Funding: A Dialog, under Demythologizing “Full” Public Funding, 
which argues against “over-selling spin” by proponents of public funding).  The best-
ever statement about contact with reality was by Thomas Huxley, the nineteenth-
century English intellectual who defended Darwin in famous Oxford debates with 
Bishop Samuel Wilberforce.   
Wilberforce, . . . scornfully asked Huxley whether he was descended from 
an ape through his grandfather or his grandmother.  Huxley had the last 
word years later, when the Bishop died after being thrown headfirst from 
a horse. . . . Huxley wrote in a letter: “For once, reality and his brains 
came into contact and the result was fatal.” 
John Tierney, Darwin the Comedian. Now That’s Entertainment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2009, at D2. 
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how we got here.  Spin matters because it interferes with honest dialog about 
where we are and what, if any, change is needed. 
What should get our attention?  That is always a question of priorities 
and relative relevance.  Here, what is “relevant” is what may help reduce the 
problems in judicial selection.  
I.  THE ENDLESS DEBATE2 
Legend has it that a long-ago Chief Justice of Texas said, “No judicial 
selection system is worth a damn.”  This view has been all but proven by 
American experience; nothing else in American law matches this subject in 
terms of the volume of written debate and endless sweat spent working for 
change.  The selection system for federal judges is unchanged but far from 
untroubled, and 
the States have never used a common method . . . . [O]ne can iden-
tify almost as many different methods . . . as there are States in the 
Union . . . . Moreover, most States have changed the way they 
choose judges at some point in their history, often more than once.3 
My focus is on judicial elections.  Since I began work on them, I have 
adhered to agnosticism about methods of selection.4  One reason is this: My 
writing and work aim at making a difference, but to say anything new on this 
subject seems almost impossible, and for the last generation the battles to 
change selection methods have been futile.5  Of course past performance is no 
  
 2. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why 
It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (2008). 
 3. Brief for the Conference of Chief Justices as Amici Curiae Supporting Nei-
ther Party at 5, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-
22).  The lead author was Thomas R. Phillips, ex-Chief Justice of Texas; I was one of 
his two co-authors, but these words were not mine.  Id. at 1. 
 4. Professors often say how much they learn from their students.  My most 
notable teacher was an Election Law seminar student, Robert Friedman, who pro-
posed a paper on elective judges’ campaign finance.  When my response was silence, 
he asked why, and I said, “Simply because it’s a terrific idea and I never thought of 
it.”  Now a notable Los Angeles lawyer, he is the one to credit or blame for getting 
me started in this domain, which, until a 1998 ABA Report and the dramatic 2000 
elections, was almost completely ignored except by a few candidates in a very few 
states and by handfuls of advocates trying to end contestable elections.  My first ven-
ture was Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Empe-
ror’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 (1985). 
 5. “Don’t let them take away your vote!” has been the landslide-winning slogan 
in Ohio (1987), Florida (2000), and South Dakota (2004), even though their appellate 
judges are selected by a “merit” system and face the voters only for “retention.”  See 
Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 
1081-82, 1090 (2007).  For further information on efforts for change, see sources 
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predictor of the future, but, as the chief justices formally resolved two years 
ago, “elections will stay in many and perhaps all of the states that have that 
system.”6  People who advocate ending contestable elections always point to 
  
cited infra note 7.  Perhaps the experience of recent decades will not continue, given 
the dramatic changes in judicial elections since 2000.  See Brandenburg & Schotland, 
supra note 1, at 1231.  Not to be overlooked: “Intellectuals are reliable lagging indica-
tors, near-infallible guides to what used to be true.”  CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE 
TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 17 (2008).  
 6. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution of February 7, 2007, 
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/JudicialSelectionResolutions/DeclarationJudicialElections.html.  
That resolution stemmed in part from lower courts’ extensions of Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 
1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 
2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).  The Resolution may have also stemmed in part from reac-
tions to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, in which she treated “the State” as if 
it were a single individual rather than the reality of an entity in which voters will not 
give up judicial elections.  She wrote, “If the State has a problem with judicial impar-
tiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of 
popularly electing judges.”  White, 536 U.S. 765, 788, 792 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring).  The problem, of course, is that the voters in many states with judicial elections 
will not give up voting for judges.  Changes in judicial selection systems may have to 
be more modest than systemic change.  Since her retirement, Justice O’Connor has 
become an icon for judicial independence.  This praise is unquestionably deserved 
due to her extraordinarily active initiative and leadership in efforts to support and 
advance the nation’s judiciary.  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Independence: Why & 
from What?, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 5, 7 (“The Sandra Day O’Connor Project on the 
State of the Judiciary at Georgetown University Law Center held conferences in 2006, 
2007, and 2008 that drew the attendance of six sitting Supreme Court Justices and 
hundreds of scholars, business and political leaders, and representatives of the non-
profit sector.”).  It is no surprise that the Justice believes that “states should do away 
with judicial elections.”  (For a description of her comments in Phoenix a few weeks 
ago, see Sandra Day O’Connor, Where Judges Can Be Bought and Sold, Jan. 28, 
2009, available at http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1739).  
But given her work with state judges and the weight of her statements, there is reason 
to believe she is open to the view that moving to “merit” is outside the realm of the 
possible in most states.  With total respect for all she did as a Justice and all she 
continues to do for justice, I hope she can be persuaded to adjust her advocacy to 
reflect two realities:  1) Her talk in Phoenix treats states as her opinion did: “If I could 
do one thing to protect judicial independence in this country,” O’Connor said, “it 
would be to convince those states that still elect their judges to adopt a merit selection 
system . . . .”  2)  She added, “. . . [S]hort of that – at least do something to remove the 
vast sums of money being collected by judicial candidates . . . .”  Id.  As Justice 
O’Connor wrote (with Justice Stevens) for the Court in the landmark McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003), “Money, like water, will always find an outlet.”  That 
is exactly what is happening in judicial campaign spending: The more we limit con-
tributions to candidates, the more funds flow to independent spending.  See, e.g., 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 
1003 (2006) (No. 05-842); Brief for Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
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some pending bill in some state (lately, Nevada), but for over one hundred 
years, the hurdles in turning proposals into constitutional amendments have 
been all but insuperable.7   
The endless debate does have new elements.  Some “merit” systems 
have recently suffered unusual confrontations between governors and nomi-
nating committees.8  Also, we have new analyses drawing upon the actual 
  
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).  No voice matters as much as hers does.  Her 
advocacy for moving to “merit” stirs attention for change.  My hope is only that she 
will draw attention to feasible steps to reduce the problems in judicial elections 
where, as is so likely, the “elective” system continues.  
 7. Nevada’s pending bill is typical: Even if enacted, it would have to be fol-
lowed by re-enactment, then passage by a majority of voters in order to become a 
constitutional amendment; Nevada voters rejected the change in 1972 and 1988.  AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, CHRONOLOGY OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL MERIT 
SELECTION BALLOT INITIATIVES, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/ 
documents/Merit_selection_chronology_1C233B5DD2692.pdf.  From 1940-67, bal-
lot propositions to move to “merit” won in seven states; in 1969-77, there were seven 
more victories and four defeats; since 1978, there have been six victories and eight 
defeats, with a two-four score for 1987 to date.  Id.  “Since 1990, legislatures in North 
Carolina, Texas, and elsewhere have considered merit selection, only to reject it.”  G. 
Alan Tarr, Politizing the Process: The New Politics of State Judicial Elections, in 
BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 52, 53 (Keith 
Bybee ed., 2007).  On the past 103 years’ glacial progress (which if continued will 
need another 160 years to end contestable elections for appellate judges and 770 years 
for trial judges), see Schotland, Introduction: Personal Views, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1361, 1366-67 (2001) (introducing “Call To Action” and papers from the National 
Summit on Improving Judicial Selection).  In fact, we might be moving in the wrong 
direction: “Back in 1906, Roscoe Pound, a scholar at Harvard Law School, started a 
campaign to have judges appointed . . . . When he spoke, eight in ten American judges 
stood for election.  Today, the figure is 87%.”  The Election of Judges: Guilty, Your 
Honour?, THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 28-29; see also My Judge is a Party 
Animal, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005, at 20.  As of 2004, 89% of state appellate and 
trial (general jurisdiction) judges face some form of election.  Twenty-six percent 
(26%) of appellate judges and 9% of trial judges face only a retention election.  See 
David Rottman, Judicial Elections in 2008, 41 BOOK OF THE STATES (2009).  “[The 
recent] loss of reform momentum has led groups like the [ABA] to seek ways of im-
proving existing modes of selection rather than transforming them, at least in the short 
run.”  G. Alan Tarr, The Judicial Branch, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 85, 99-100 (G. Alan 
Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (footnotes omitted).  How telling it is that in 
1988 Professor Tarr wrote of the movement toward “merit” systems.  G. ALAN TARR 
& MARY CORDELIA PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 61 
(1990).  Many lawyers and good-government advocates have a strong preference for 
“merit” systems, but “the evidence supporting [the claims for its superiority] is largely 
anecdotal.”  The Judicial Branch, supra.   
 8. On confrontations in Missouri in 2007, see Kit Wagar, Conservatives De-
nounce Governor’s Pick for the Missouri Supreme Court, KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 
8, 2007, at A1.  On Tennessee in 2007, see Erik Schelzig, [Gov.] Bredesen Hopes 
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operation of “merit” systems to argue that some are dominated (or even con-
trolled) by the organized bar and that at least some actions have been parti-
san.9  Further, unless the Tennessee legislature does this spring what it re-
fused to do in 2008, its “merit” system for appellate judges will terminate in 
June 2009.  This would be the first time for any jurisdiction to return to con-
testable elections after ending them.10   
  
Next Judicial Pick Less Political, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Sept. 29, 2007, at 
3.  In New York in December 2008, to fill the vacancy created by the mandatory 
retirement of their revered Chief Judge Judith Kaye, the governor objected strongly to 
being given seven nominations, all male.  See Jeremy W. Peters, Paterson Criticizes 
Panel For Its Judicial Selections, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A39.  Many of us 
found it inconceivable, especially for New York, that only men would be nominated.  
Fortunately, the new Chief is the outstanding Judge Jonathan Lippman, but, when the 
Senate confirmed him without dissent, senators called for “examin[ing] the flawed 
process of judicial nomination.”  Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Confirms Top Judge on 
State Court of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A32.  The newest organized 
grass-roots dissatisfaction with judicial selection is Virginia’s “Pitchfork Rebellion,” 
seeking change in its system of selection by the legislature, Tom Jackman, Va. Judge 
Selection Process Criticized: Group Challenges Lack of Public Input, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 2, 2009, at B1. 
 9. See Stephen J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 386 (2008) (arguing that Kansas uniquely empowers the Bar); Robert C. 
Casad, A Comment on “Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court”, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 424 (responding to Ware); Linda Parks, Judicial Selection Counterpoint, 77 J. 
KAN. B. ASS’N 7 (2008); Stephen Ware, Judicial Selection Point, 77 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 
6 (2008).  On Kansas’s latest judicial appointment (the law partner of the State’s 
Democratic Party chairman), see Stephen J. Ware, Ware: Open Up Process of Picking 
Justices, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 23, 2009, at A3.  For a response to the latest attack on 
Kansas’s nominating commission members with “selective distortion of data,” see 
James M. Concannon & Robert C. Casad, James M. Concannon and Robert C. Ca-
sad: Data Does Not Support Claim of Radical Lawyers, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 11, 
2009, at A3.    
 10. Tennessee, in 1971, ended partisan elections for appellate judges.  TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (2009).  This is the nation’s only move to “merit” by mere 
statute.  Pursuant to a general statute that “sunsets” unless a reenactment is passed, the 
“merit” system would end June 30, 2009.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-112, -229 (2009) 
(terminating twenty-eight governmental entities on June 30, 2008, and allowing them 
to “wind up” until June 30, 2009).  See also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Election as Ap-
pointment: The Tennessee Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473 (2008); Penny J. 
White & Malia Reddick, A Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The Rest of the Story, 
75 TENN. L. REV. 501 (2008); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Errors, Omissions, and the Ten-
nessee Play, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 85 (2008).  In June 2009, Tennessee’s “merit” sys-
tem was extended for two years, but now all members of the nominating commission 
will be appointed by, separately, the governor and the legislative leaders; bar associa-
tions will no longer have power to fill any seats.  See Richard Locker, “Year of the 
Gun” Ends with a Bang, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 21, 2009; Monica 
Mercer, Locals Apply to Panel to Nominate State Judges, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE 
PRESS, Aug. 3, 2009.  In 2008, Missouri’s Greene County moved to merit selection 
 
23
512 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74   
 
II.  A REPLY TO ADVOCACY AT THE SYMPOSIUM 
At the Symposium, some advocates urged judicial elections as the only 
way – or at least the best way – to assure accountability; that advocacy re-
quires response.  Without diminishing my decades-long adherence to agnos-
ticism about judicial selection methods, I submit six points in response to 
such advocacy.     
First: The advocates of judicial elections base their argument on the no-
tion that the norm in America is to elect any high official who has a role in 
policy; that injecting “merit”-system screening at the selection stage is “elit-
ism;” and that the “merit” system’s retention elections are not elections but 
“referenda.”   
Though we give elections an enormous role, we do not have “majorita-
rian democracy uber alles.”  We have a republican form of government with 
mediating tools and structures like the U.S. Senate (not “elitist” but federal-
ist), the executive veto, and, of course, judicial review by appointed judges, 
including life-tenured ones.  The “merit” system, good or bad, is one more 
mediating structure in our ever-evolving system of checks and balances.  We 
choose mediating devices to advance deliberativeness.    
Why do advocates urging elections aim all their effort at judges and ig-
nore administrative officials – from zoning to police searches and the regula-
tion of health and the environment – who govern vastly more of our lives?  
One possibility is that administrators are subject to removal.  But, so are state 
judges; retention elections guarantee periodic opportunities for removal by 
voters, and contestable elections offer opportunities to hold incumbents ac-
countable.  The reality of modern governance is remarkably far from the be-
liefs of myth-laden voters, which were described perfectly by a Mississippi 
editor in 2002.  After voters defeated a ballot proposition to lengthen judicial 
terms from four to six years, the editor commented, “They’d vote on the 
mailman if they could.”11 
Whether one applauds the “merit” system (perhaps as excellent, perhaps 
as only the best available alternative) or attacks it (from its self-applauding 
label to some states’ excessive role for lawyers), our dialog about judicial 
  
by popular vote, the first such move anywhere since 1985.  See Am. Judicature Soc’y, 
Voters in Four Jurisdictions Opt for Merit Selection on November 4 (2008), 
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_voters.asp.  Missouri allows a local option for trial 
courts, and Greene County, the largest jurisdiction still having contestable elections, 
was Missouri’s first move since 1985.  Id.  Also in 2008, Kansas voters in Johnson 
County (Kansas City) rejected returning to contestable elections.  And in Alabama, 
which also allows local option for trial courts, voters in two counties chose the “me-
rit” system for appointments to fill vacancies.  Id. 
 11. Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan 
Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE. L. REV. 1397, 1422 n.80 (2003). 
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selection needs to be freer of spin.  We need more discussion like that pro-
vided by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.12 
Second: Accountability for judges is secured not only by facing election 
but also by pervasive procedural requirements like appeals and written opi-
nions, by massive bodies of law that cabin decision and even discretion, and 
by disciplinary oversight that is incomparably closer and more active than for 
other elective officials.  Some all-out advocates of elections for judges argue 
that accountability solely means accountability to voters.  But, even if one 
accepts that shrunken definition, it misses the point that voters often choose 
to replace direct elections with other modes of selection and accountability.  
It misses the point even where contestable elections are retained because hav-
ing contestable elections gives almost no opportunity, in fact, for the voters to 
choose: contests are nearly non-existent.  While high-court elections do draw 
competition, the norm for our trial judges is like the California experience: Of 
its roughly 450 Superior Court judges up for re-election in 2004, only nine 
were even challenged.  From 1972-2002, challenges peaked at 5.1% in 1978, 
two years after Rose Bird overcame opposition and won retention, with the 
only other “high” being 3.2% in 1988, two years after she was defeated.  
From 1996-2004, of the sixty-seven judges who were challenged, only nine 
lost, although obviously challengers would take on only vulnerable judges.  
From 2000-2004, of the thirty-nine who were challenged, only four lost – one 
of them literally a wife-beater; twenty-one of that thirty-nine were landslide 
winners, getting over 65%, while another twelve got over 55% of the vote.13   
Third: The most frequent attack on the “merit” system is that it does not 
abolish “politics.”  This point has two fatal flaws: (a) With all due respect, it 
is preposterous to think that one could or would want to remove all politics 
from any official action in a democracy; and (b) The attack is based on lump-
thinking, treating all “politics” as the same.  But everywhere, even among 
nursery school kiddies, we find “politics” of some type.  The inescapability of 
“politics” was never stated better than it was by New York’s Schuyler Cha-
pin, general manager of the Metropolitan Opera, Dean of Columbia’s School 
of the Arts, and New York City’s Commissioner of Cultural Affairs: “Politics 
are at their worst in the arts world and the academic world.”14  In fact, “merit” 
  
 12. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri 
Plan, 74 MO. L. REV. 479 (2009).   
 13. For high-court data, see Melinda Gann Hall, On the Cataclysm of Judicial 
Elections and Other Popular Anti-Democratic Myths (Mar. 27, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript).  The California trial-court data are from Roy A. Schotland, The Croco-
dile in the Bathtub: Achieving the Right Balance Between Judicial Accountability and 
Judicial Independence in Terms for Trial Court Judges, CAL. CTS. REV., Fall 2005, at 
10, 12.  
 14. Daniel J. Wakin, Schuyler G. Chapin, Stalwart Champion of the Arts in New 
York, Dies at 86, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at A21.  “Politics” in judicial elections 
are skewed by the entry, even dominance, of factors like name familiarity, which of 
course matters in all kinds of elections but is uniquely important in judicial elections. 
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selection greatly reduces the relevant kinds of politics: partisanship and the 
inside track for people active in the realm of electoral politics for non-judicial 
offices.  For example, in 2008 in Johnson County, Kansas (Kansas City), 
where voters defeated a proposal to end the local “merit” system, one of the 
arguments used to defend that system pointed to the elective system in Wichi-
ta (Sedgwick County), where “three judges are former state legislators and a 
current state senator [was] running for a judgeship . . . .”15   
Fourth: Elections are crude forums, at best, for airing and making deci-
sions about judicial performance.  Roe v. Wade, flag salutes, lightning-rod 
capital cases, cases about a child, and cases about other dramatically personal 
plights (e.g., Terri Schiavo) are infinitely far from the docket of virtually any 
judge who faces some election – but many judicial campaigns have involved, 
often centered on, such matters.  Even in state high courts, the tiny portion of 
the docket that involves constitutional issues is either dictated (or nearly so) 
by federal court precedent or does not involve high-visibility matters.  The 
hot-button issues or cases likely to get attention in campaigns are a complete 
(or near-complete) distortion of what the judge or candidate has done or can 
do.  Would anyone say that the public discourse about hot-button cases is any 
better than distorting, hyper-simplification, and slanting?  Such episodes are 
outbursts of passion seeking to displace our processes and dispassionate, de-
liberative efforts to act justly – the opposite of all we revere as the rule of 
law.  As an ABA task force found,  
[n]ever is there more potential for judicial accountability being dis-
torted and judicial independence being jeopardized than when a 
judge is campaigned against because of a stand on a single issue or 
even in a single case.  In such a situation, it is particularly impor-
tant for lawyers to support the judicial process and the rule of 
law.16 
  
A dramatic example: In 2006, California judge Dzintra Janavs, a twenty-year veteran 
outstanding in complex litigation and endorsed by a large, varied spectrum of offi-
cials, lost to bagel shop owner Lynn Diane Olson, see Roy A. Schotland, New Chal-
lenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1093 (2007).  In Texas in 
2008, a striking new pattern has emerged:  “color-based voting,” not racial but with “a 
last name that appears on a palette,” e.g., Mary Kay Green and Susan Brown won 
despite paltry funding.  Rick Casey, How Judge Candidates Waste Money, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, Oct. 24, 2008.  For many states’ experience over many decades, see Roy 
A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing, supra note 4 at 88-89. 
 15. Grace Hobson, Johnson County Defeats Election System for Judges, KANSAS 
CITY STAR, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1. 
 16. A.B.A., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ 
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS PART 2, at 6 (1998) [hereinafter A.B.A. TASK FORCE].  For 
an unusually compelling, even moving, statement of the poor fit between judicial 
elections and a judge’s caliber, see Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, Op-Ed, Why Not 
Elect Judges on Merit, Not Whim?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 12, 2009, availa-
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Fifth: The mere potential of lightning-rod distortions jeopardizes judicial 
independence and open-mindedness.  A sitting judge who will soon face an 
election may understandably, perhaps inescapably, be concerned about being 
on the wrong side of a hot-button matter.  California Justice Otto Kaus re-
ferred to this as being “like finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go 
in to shave in the morning.  You know it’s there, and you try not to think 
about it, but it’s hard to think about much else while you’re shaving.”17  A 
leading local observer wrote this:  
[W]hen the rumblings about an electoral challenge to the justices 
had turned to thunder, Otto Kaus announced his resignation from 
the supreme court.  He took advantage of his new freedom to speak 
candidly on the impact of electoral challenges upon the indepen-
dence of the court.  On one such occasion, I was among a large au-
dience at a forum sponsored by the Los Angeles County Bar Asso-
ciation.  I remember how stunned I was when I heard Otto recount 
to the audience how a “friend” had suggested in a speech in San 
Francisco that his vote on the decision to uphold Proposition 8 had 
been affected by the threats made to his reelection and how in     
retrospect he himself wasn’t sure it hadn’t.18  
Sixth: The “judicial personality” that is likely to seek and get a judgeship 
is different, usually deeply so, from the “political personality” that will    
willingly, perhaps eagerly, engage in election campaigns.  To the extent that 
judicial elections continue as they were traditionally held – “low-key affairs, 
conducted with civility and dignity” or “about as exciting as a game of 
checkers played by mail” – the electoral route is not an obstacle to getting and 
keeping the people who are likely to be fine judges.19  However, the more 
judicial campaigns become like campaigns generally, the more the elective 
route will change who are our judges and will probably lower the caliber of 
the bench.20 
But of course, the above six points are not dispositive distinctions be-
tween modes of judicial selection, for we would not have an “endless debate” 
  
ble at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/viewpoints/stories 
/DN-jefferson_13edi.State.Edition1.2212195.html. 
 17. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaning the Inde-
pendence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1133 (1996). 
 18. Gerald F. Uelmen, Otto Kaus and the Crocodile, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
971, 973-71 (1997).  California justices face retention-only elections. 
 19. William C. Bayne, Lynchard’s Candidacy, Ads Putting Spice Into Justice 
Race: Hernando Attorney Challenging Cobb, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Oct. 
29, 2000, at 1; Hon. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There 
One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995). 
 20. See infra text accompanying note 28. 
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if the differences were clearly compelling rather than, in large measure, mat-
ters of degree.  Surely this is one of the countless matters on which no single 
answer is best everywhere, at least with our differences among jurisdictions 
(both current differences and political traditions).  For example, Missouri, 
which is so notable that “merit” systems everywhere are often referred to as 
“the Missouri plan,” does allow local option among counties.21  Thus, two-
thirds of Missouri’s trial judges – all in places with the kinds of personal con-
tact and word-of-mouth connections that are impossible in the major metro-
politan areas – have continued with contestable elections.  In fact, in 2008, 
Missouri’s largest county with contestable elections – Greene County – voted 
to switch to “merit.”22  Further, apart from differences among jurisdictions, 
each selection mode has strengths and weaknesses that inescapably lead dif-
ferent people to different overall evaluations.  For example, we have evidence 
that initially elected judges in California, Florida, and New York are more 
likely to be disciplined for misconduct than judges appointed to fill vacan-
cies; also, several studies have found that sentencing by elective judges may 
be affected by electoral considerations.23  On the other hand, undeniably 
“there are times when an exceptional candidate for the bench, who later does 
become a well-regarded judge, is unable to get an appointment and would 
never have reached the bench but for the electoral route.”24  Also, as a Penn-
sylvania justice said recently, “[C]ampaigning is a humbling experience.  . . . 
You’re meeting with citizens . . . [in] poor neighborhoods, wealthy neighbor-
hoods, ethnic neighborhoods.  I think it makes you a better judge.”25 
One other reaction to the Symposium discussion is a plea to academics 
who deal with judicial selection: Instead of continuing “the endless debate” as 
in the recent proliferation of articles defending and opposing this or that me-
thod of selection, we need research and writing on realities, like the actual 
operation of selection systems and of courts.  For example, we need to know 
more about how many vacancies are filled initially by appointment (whatever 
the system), with the new appointees later facing election as incumbents, and 
especially about career patterns.  This would help us see, among other things, 
what proportion of the bench is former prosecutors (in each system) and 
where judges go when they leave the bench.26   
  
 21. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25b. 
 22. See Am. Judicature Soc’y, supra note 10.  
 23. See Schotland, supra note 5, at 1087 & n.36. 
 24. Id. at 1091 (giving striking recent examples from Minnesota and Califor-
nia).    
 25. Bobby Kerlik, Judges Face Problems When Their Cases Involve Donors, 
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Mar. 22, 2009 (quoting Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
Justice Max Baer). 
 26. For exemplary studies of reality, see Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, 
The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: The Least Political Method of Selecting High 
Quality Judges, 74 MO. L. REV. 711 (2009); Rachel Paine Caulfield, How the Pickers 
Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORD. 
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Let us put aside the endless debate and focus on feasible changes to re-
duce the problematic aspects of judicial elections.  The debate distracts se-
verely and concretely: In any state where events (or reform energies) stir dis-
satisfaction with judicial elections, the first response is to work toward ending 
contestable elections.  Understandable as that response is, its supporters ig-
nore (or, more likely, do not realize) that for the past generation that route has 
gone nowhere, and, consequently, they have failed to even try for feasible 
improvements – which get little to no attention, leaving the problems to con-
tinue or even worsen. 
III.  ARE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS LIKE OTHER ELECTIONS, 
 SHOULD THEY BE? 
In fact, elections for the bench are bound to be different in many ways – 
and should be – because the judge’s job is so different from other elected 
officials:   
[O]ther elected officials are open to meeting – at any time and 
openly or privately – their constituents or anyone who may be af-
fected by their action in pending or future matters, but judges are 
not similarly open; nonjudicial candidates [are free to] seek support 
by making promises about how they will perform; [o]ther elected 
officials are advocates, free to cultivate and reward support by 
working with their supporters to advance shared goals; other 
elected officials pledge to change law, and if elected they often 
work unreservedly toward change; other elected officials partici-
pate in diverse and usually large multi-member bodies; other 
elected incumbents build up support through “constituent case-
work,” patronage, securing benefits for communities, etc.; almost 
all other elected officials face challenges in every election; [and 
last, fundraising by judicial candidates is uniquely constrained].27  
Consider how judges make decisions compared to how legislators and 
executives make their decisions.  To make any decision in a case, a judge 
must hear the parties, find facts (if any are relevant) cabined by rules of evi-
dence, determine the relevant law, and apply it.  A judge must be open-
minded, and her decision must be based on a record, subject to appeal.28  In 
  
URB. L.J. 163 (2007); Fred N. Six, testimonies comparing details of “merit” systems 
in different States, before Kansas Senate and House Judiciary Committees, Special 
Committee on Judiciary, and House State & Federal Affairs Committee, 2/21/05, 
10/21/05, 2/08/06, 2/13/07, 2/21/08 and 2/12/09.    
 27. Robert M. O’Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment 
Rulings, 34 IND. L. REV. 701, 716-17 (2002). 
 28. Of course in some matters judges “make law,” but, in the first place, 
judges’ law-making is almost entirely merely interstitial, technical, and subject to 
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contrast, legislators and executive officials can act with no hearings, with no 
record, and based on whatever mix of facts they like (i.e., unsubstantiated 
“facts,” etc.).  Further, if they do have hearings, they are shaped freely by the 
law-makers.  And their actions are not reviewed except by public opinion 
(apart from the very few matters that raise either constitutional questions or, 
for executive officials, questions of compliance with statutory requirements); 
legislation and executive action needs only public support or tolerance.  Last, 
but perhaps most important of all, judges’ actions directly impact one or a 
few individuals, a power and responsibility that is unique except for execu-
tives’ power to pardon.  To deny the differences between selecting judges and 
selecting other officials is to deny the differences between the judges’ job and 
the jobs of other elective officials; to deny the differences between the 
branches is to deny a bedrock of our republican form of government: checks 
and balances. 
One more crucial factor calls for keeping judicial elections from being 
like other elections.  As noted above, no-holds-barred elective campaigns will 
affect the pool of people willing to run for the bench and for re-election.29  
That would work against the whole goal of efforts surrounding judicial selec-
tion: to bring to the bench people as suitable as we can find for the unique 
responsibilities and powers of judges. 
  
override by the other branches.  Holmes put it unforgettably: “I recognize without 
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they 
are confined from molar to molecular motions.”  Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 
U.S. 205, 220-21 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Even full common-law “making” is 
always subject to, and often overridden by, legislation.  Second, law-making by 
judges is almost entirely limited to high courts and, even there, is a minor fraction of 
the docket, even in the U.S. Supreme Court.  The high visibility of the cases in which 
judges’ law-making is significant not only (understandably) misleads the public but 
also distorts the view of lawyers and others who know better.  While judges make 
very little law, trial judges do rule on motions and other matters that are not subject to 
appeal.  However, even there (a) they are cabined by process, practice, and a great 
deal of relevant law; and (b) the matter is appealable and/or, if significant, will be 
reviewed despite doctrine about limited review.  I doubt that even those who want 
judicial elections to be like other elections and who rely on elections to hold judges 
accountable can imagine a judicial candidate running on a platform stating her ap-
proach to motions about discovery or forum non conveniens.   
 29. Roy A. Schotland, Six Fatal Flaws: A Comment on Bopp and Neeley, 86 
DENV. L. REV. 235, 242-45 (2008).  Only after writing that, I discovered the unusually 
rich article in this law review, Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge be a Good Poli-
tician? Judicial Elections from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV. 433 (2005). 
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IV.  THE LIVELY, THORNY PROBLEM OF RECUSAL BECAUSE OF 
CAMPAIGN CONDUCT AND/OR CAMPAIGN FUNDING 
“The topic du jour is recusal,” said Judge M. Margaret McKeown of the 
Ninth Circuit.30  “The time has come for elected courts, which are at the eye 
of the storm, to replace anxiety about declining public trust with active meas-
ures to restore it.  . . . [C]urrent disqualification doctrines and procedures are 
inadequate.  . . . [D]ue process interests [are] in severe jeopardy across the 
states . . . .”31 
Several years before the Supreme Court brought judicial recusal into the 
spotlight with its review of Capterton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the need to 
modernize recusal (used here to include disqualification) became acute for 
two reasons.32  First, since the Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minn-
esota v. White,33 it is more likely that judges will make “campaign statements 
that may seem to prejudge . . . or compromise their impartiality.”34  Second, 
“perhaps the greatest cause of consternation is large campaign contributions 
from attorneys and parties with business before state courts.”35 
  
 30. M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the 
Appearance of Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 45 (2005). 
 31. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample, & David E. Pozen, The Best De-
fense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 
504, 509 (2007).   
 32. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 33. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 34. Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and 
Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. 
REV. 691 (2007).  In fact, as important as White has been, so far it has had little 
impact on campaigns, but that will change as traditional norms are eroded by 
envelope-stretching candidates.  See Roy Schotland, Impacts of White, 55 DRAKE 
L. REV. 625, 635-36 (2007).   
 35. Goldberg, Sample, & Pozen, supra note 31, at 508.  Note that the propor-
tions of contributions from lawyers (let alone lawyers who come before judges to 
whom they contributed) are far less than the point-with-alarm myth: (a) They 
accounted for 22% of contributions in 2000, 37% in 2002, and 22% in 2004, or 
26% on average.  Data compiled by National Institute on Money in State Politics 
(on file with author).  See www.followthemoney.org.  (b) As the 1998 ABA Task 
Force stressed, “Often attorneys account for large proportions [of donors], often 
even over 75 percent . . . but it is also true that often attorneys’ contributions total 
only a minor fraction [of total funds collected].”  A.B.A. TASK FORCE, supra note 
16, at 89.  The myth has notable believers.  See, e.g., Derek Bok, Too Many Be-
holden Judges, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 25, 2002, at A8 (“Judges raise roughly half of 
their campaign funds from lawyers and law firms.”).   
An obviously important point is too often overlooked:  
We have no doubt that most contributions from lawyers are motivated 
not by any hope of currying favor, but by the conviction that if law-
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Given the two 2007 articles just cited and the Caperton briefs, treatment 
here can be limited to one point about procedure and one point about stan-
dards.  The ABA’s Standing Committee on Judicial Independence has been at 
work on recusal since 2007.  The Conference of Chief Justices has similarly 
been working on the issue.  The Conference submitted an amicus brief in 
Caperton, has held sessions on the matter, and is well at work on this sub-
ject.36  Additionally, several state courts have produced significant work in 
the area of recusal and, starting before the Caperton decision, have proposed 
advances.  With Caperton now decided, all this is bound to go forward. 
First, I will look at the issue of procedure.  Many states have fine, even 
exemplary, procedures for trial-court judges’ recusal, from peremptory-strike 
challenges by litigants to automatically sending recusal motions to an admin-
istrative judge (or, as in Ohio, to the chief justice).37  However, at many ap-
pellate courts and at even more high courts, recusal cries for procedures that 
can assure fairness, protect public confidence, and – to put it simply – work 
effectively and smoothly (no small challenge).  In a very few high courts 
(e.g., Alabama and Texas), a member’s decision to participate, despite a mo-
tion seeking recusal, is reviewed by the full court; some multi-member courts 
have other processes.  But many multi-member courts (especially high courts) 
have no procedure other than leaving recusal decisions entirely to the judge 
targeted by a motion.   
A suggested procedure: For high courts (perhaps also for intermediate 
appellate courts, although for them a greater variety of procedures may 
work), we should adopt a version of the NFL’s Rooney Rule.  That rule re-
  
yers do not support able judges, who will?  Many lawyers say it is a 
professional obligation, in a jurisdiction where judges stand for elec-
tion, to give appropriate support to good judges and good candidates.  
Indeed, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility supports this 
[citing Canon 2 and Ethical Consideration 8-6].   
A.B.A. TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 26-27.  In 1955, Oregon’s Chief Justice 
Harold J. Warner listed as one of the four essentials to maintaining judicial inde-
pendence “the vigilant and able support of the bar.”  Paul J. De Muniz, Politiciz-
ing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 367, 379 (2002) (quoting Warner Speaks on Judicial Freedom, OR. ST. 
B. BULL, June 1955, at 1, 4). 
 36. The Chief Justices’ brief was quoted by the Caperton majority, see 129 
S. Ct. at 2266, and noted in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, id. at 2273.   
 37. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(C):  
The chief justice of the Supreme Court or any judge of that court des-
ignated by him shall pass upon the disqualification of any judge of the 
courts of appeals or courts of common pleas or division thereof.  Rules 
may be adopted to provide for the hearing of disqualification matters 
involving judges of courts established by law.   
See also R.C. 2701.03, at http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2701.03; and for municipal 
and county court judges R.C. 2701.031, at http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2701.031.  
2009] A PLEA FOR REALITY 521 
 
quires teams, when interviewing candidates for coaching positions, to include 
at least one minority prospect.  While that rule may have been adopted largely 
because of the special status of the Rooney family in the NFL, the rule has 
been a significant success.  All the rule requires is a conversation – a chance 
to talk and to listen. 
When a litigant seeks the recusal of a justice, if the court leaves such de-
cisions to the justice individually, before the justice makes a decision, she or 
he shall have a conversation (if necessary, by conference call) with a panel of 
three court-appointed “wise souls” (probably retired judges, lawyers, and 
legal academics with rotating terms of, say, two years).  The consultation 
shall be confidential.  A potential rule might provide that consultation is un-
necessary if the justice decides to grant the recusal motion, or a rule might 
call for consultation even then to promote dialog, to promote uniformity, and 
to protect the “duty to sit.”38  One might add a requirement for the justice to 
write an opinion, or one might add other steps.39  
Second, about the standards used in recusal situations, Justice Kennedy 
wrote, concurring in White, “[Minnesota] may adopt recusal standards more 
rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these 
standards.”40  “Due process [is] assessed by reference to ‘those fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and polit-
ical institutions.’”41  (Here, as in Caperton, only issues arising in the context 
of campaign finance are discussed.)   
For a new judge to sit in a case argued by a lawyer with whom a few 
months earlier she was in partnership, or who was her leading campaign  
fundraiser, would raise such probability of bias that – in my view – recusal 
  
 38. On many state courts’ traditional “duty to sit,” see RICHARD E. FLAMM, 
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 610-12 (2d 
ed. 2007). 
 39. The suggested procedure might stand alone, but further steps should be 
considered: (1) If the judge decides to deny the motion, should there be a written 
decision, or should that be left entirely up to the decider?  Or, even if a motion is 
granted, might an opinion be useful for future reference?  (In courts which receive 
many recusal motions from pro se litigants, those may warrant separate treatment on 
all counts.)  Some commentators who favor the procedure suggest that, if it is 
adopted, written opinions should be called for lest the new procedure be deemed, 
however unfairly, insufficient.  And even if the judge decides to grant the motion, a 
written opinion, however brief, would be valuable for future reference.  (2) Wholly 
apart from whether the suggested procedure is adopted, consideration should be given 
to how, when a judge does withdraw from a case, the replacement is selected (e.g., 
some courts select from retired judges or presiding judges of lower courts).  Such 
selection is no problem if it is entirely up to the presiding judge, but the person in that 
position is not always one who enjoys full support from her or his colleagues.  (3) 
What of occasions when several members of the court withdraw from a case? 
 40. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002).   
 41. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 32 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 100 U.S. 516, 535 (1884)). 
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would be required as a matter of “fundamental fairness,” i.e., due process.  In 
comparison, for a judge to hear a case argued by a lawyer who was a partner 
or fundraiser, say, fifteen years earlier, would be unproblematic.  For that 
type of “conflicting” interest, a flat line can, and surely should, be drawn by 
court rules, taking into account the minimum requirements of due process and 
the value of fuller protection.   
Again, noting the recent articles and Caperton, the treatment here can be 
skeletal and limited to one key point: If the facts (e.g., campaign support that 
was extraordinary compared to the campaign as a whole and to the jurisdic-
tion’s practices) create a “‘probability of actual bias [that] is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable,’” fundamental fairness – let alone public confi-
dence – requires recusal.42  If recusal were triggered only by a judge’s finan-
cial stake, close relationship, or “actual bias,” protection of fundamental fair-
ness would be hollow.  On the other hand, if the probability of bias is not 
substantial, then mere “appearances” cannot control.43 
  
 42. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (quoting 
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).  In Caperton, the CCJ’s amicus brief set 
forth eight “criteria [that] must be evaluated . . . .”  See Brief of the Conference of 
Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 26-31, Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).  An important note about 
campaign “support”: Contributions to candidates are only part, a shrinking part, of 
spending in campaigns.  Independent spending may overwhelm candidates’ own 
spending, as in Caperton.  There, the independent spending that led to the recusal 
motion now being reviewed by the Supreme Court totaled over $3 million; that 
spender had contributed only $1,000 directly to the candidate.  Caperton v. A.T. Mas-
sey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).  Recusal standards cannot be tied to con-
tributions and ignore independent spending: A tie to contributions will obviously only 
increase independent spending.  The unavoidable and worsening move to independent 
spending renders counterproductive any recommendation that ignores independent 
spending, like recent recommendations (incomprehensibly) by the Brennan Center.  
James Sample, David Pozen & Michael Young, Fair Courts: Setting Recusal Stan-
dards, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST., Apr. 1, 2008, available at http://www.brennan 
center.org/content/resource/fair_courts_setting_recusal_standards. 
 43. The Caperton amicus briefs are a laboratory example of good lawyering 
and its absence.  Like the Brief for Petitioners, some of the amicus briefs (supporting 
Petitioners or arguing that the standard applied below did not satisfy due process) 
stressed “probability,” with almost a score of explicit references.  Brief for Petitioners 
at *3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).  In 
contrast are other briefs that stress “appearances,” making much of polls and newspa-
per editorials; some of those briefs seem written more for editorial boards than to 
persuade Justices.  Imagining what Justice Scalia may write about the “appearances” 
test is the surest way to think about how loose and perilous it is.  Wholly apart from 
that, one should not miss the most imaginative argument in the amicus briefs, the 
closing paragraph of the brief for law professors Ronald D. Rotunda and Michael R. 
Dimino, supporting Justice Benjamin’s denial of the motion that he withdraw: “The 
appointment of federal judges is really an election, where the nominator is the Presi-
dent and the universe of voters is limited to the United States Senate.  Any rule fash-
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V.  REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS 
Given the Caperton result, new recusal rules are needed and will not be 
delayed.44  The ABA and the state high courts have become dramatically 
more organized for responsiveness than in the past.  We are indebted to the 
ABA for the Canons of Judicial Conduct started under former Chief Justice 
Taft, and now, when the Model Code is revised, the ABA works to support 
action on them.  The contrast between the recent and still-pending wide-
spread actions on the most recent Code amendments and the 1999 amend-
ment about recusal and campaign contributions, which was not even consi-
dered by more than three or four high courts, is stunning.  True, some courts 
in fact did impressively thorough work on that provision (although not pub-
licly), but in most of the thirty-nine states where judges face elections, noth-
ing at all was done, even though election campaign spending was creating 
more and more problems.45  It is not that the Canons were a low priority; 
rather, it is that courts tend to be responders, deciders of cases, not initiators 
of rule-making.   
There would not have been a White case if the Minnesota court – despite 
its excellent leadership and members – had not ignored the Model Code’s 
1990 elimination of the “Announce” clause, which was done precisely be-
cause of strong doubts about its constitutionality.  For that matter, when 
White came down in June 2002, it took the Minnesota court seventeen months 
simply to appoint an advisory committee to recommend how to respond, and 
it took an additional five months before the committee had finally reported.  
During almost all of that time, the Eighth Circuit, having before it the remand 
in White, was patient – the ultimate dissent even set forth the timetable.  Per-
haps a timely revision of Minnesota’s Canon would have affected the deci-
sion on remand, a serious loss for Minnesota and therefore for all states’ roles 
in choosing judicial selection systems and regulating judicial campaigns.46   
  
ioned in this case will eventually work its way into the federal system, with unknown 
results.”  Brief of Law Professors Ronald D. Rotunda and Michael R. Dimino as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 21, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).  That is, we elect our Ambassadors?   
 44. Legislation does not work well on this subject.  For example, see Ala-
bama’s futile §12-24-1, enacted in 1995 and unavoidably buried the next year.  See 
REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT BY THE ALABAMA STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES 
OF CONDUCT AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (on file with author).  See also Roger 
M. Baron, A Proposal for the Use of a Judicial Peremptory Challenge System in Tex-
as, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 49, 54 (1988).  
 45. However, one knowledgeable high-court administrator said rightly that the 
1999 amendment “is 10 years old, yet it remains an orphan.  We are long past the time 
for the ABA to take a hard look at this . . . .”  E-mail to Roy A. Schotland (on file 
with author).   
 46. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting).  The Eighth Circuit struck down Minnesota’s “par-
tisan-activities” clause, which provided that judicial candidates could not “identify 
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New rules are needed on recusal processes and standards; with the result 
in Caperton, we will get them soon. 
VI.  STEPS TO REDUCE THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS 
 OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
In addition to modernizing recusal – 
a) Lengthen terms: Ohio’s Chief Justice Moyer has actively pressed for 
steps to meet the challenges created by changes in judicial elections.  Starting 
in 2003, he made it his top priority to lengthen Ohio’s six-year terms to 
eight.47  Such a step helps on all (and I stress, all) the problematic aspects of 
judicial elections.  Although I have long urged term-lengthening as a feasible 
step, the record makes me view this as only “ought-to-be feasible.”48   
b) Public funding:  This is many people’s favorite step and unquestion-
ably brings advances but is oversold:  
(i) It cannot end the impact of (indeed, it will encourage) indepen-
dent spending, and so it is at best an incomplete step to meet the challenge.49  
(ii) Even all-out supporters of public funding generally wonder about 
its desirability for judicial elections because it may encourage competition, 
  
themselves as members of a political organization, except as necessary to vote in an 
election” and could not “attend political gatherings; or seek, accept or use endorse-
ments from a political organization.”  That decision directly jeopardizes the choice by 
nineteen states other than Minnesota to have nonpartisan judicial elections.  (The 
states are listed in Schotland, New Challenges, supra note 5, at 1104.) 
 47. See Jon Craig, Longer Terms for Judges Proposed, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Nov. 7, 2003, at 1B. 
 48. Consider the term-length picture: For appellate judges who face elections, 
38.5% have terms of ten to fifteen years, and another 60.6% have six- to eight-year 
terms.  For trial judges who face elections, 13% have terms of ten to fifteen years, and 
another 67.6% have six- to eight-year terms.  Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial 
Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 154-55 tbls. 3 & 
5 (1998).  In Mississippi in 2002, Chief Justice Pittman placed on the ballot a proposi-
tion to lengthen judges’ terms from four to six years, but that was voted down 63%-
37%.  Voters Reject Longer Terms for Trial Judges, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), 
Nov. 6, 2002, at A5.  As one editor commented to the author, “They’d vote on the 
mailman if they could.”  Schotland, supra note 11, at 1422 n.80.  Since 1968, only 
three states have lengthened terms: Hawaii in 1968 to ten years from six or seven, 
Montana in 1972 to eight or six years from six or four years, and Nevada in 1976 to 
six years from four.  Louisiana, in 1972, shortened terms to ten years from fourteen or 
twelve.  See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES – HISTORY 
OF REFORM EFFORTS, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/ 
reform_efforts/formal_changes_since_Inception.cfm?state=.     
 49. Independent spending continues to soar generally.  Steve Weissman & 
Suraj Sazawal, Soft Money Political Spending by 501(c) Nonprofits Tripled in 2008 
Election, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.cfinst.org/pr/ 
prRelease.aspx?ReleaseID=221. 
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but “a well-qualified judge should be freed as much as possible from political 
pressure.”50      
(iii) Sheer cost makes feasibility very slight, except for small-
population states.  When this step was being debated in Ohio, a supreme court 
justice likely to be sympathetic said he would “be surprised if we can get 
much traction for it . . . .  You could probably get more interest in the General 
Assembly for legislation to keep cats on a leash.”51  Even if adopted, funding 
fades toward the vanishing point; in Wisconsin – the first state (1979) with 
public funding for any judicial campaigns (there, supreme court only) – the 
program worked well initially, but by 2007 the available funds totaled 2% of 
the two candidates’ spending.52 
c) Campaign conduct committees and candidate education: Justice Ken-
nedy, concurring in White, addressed what can be done to meet inappropriate 
conduct in judicial campaigns: “The legal profession, the legal academy, the 
press, voluntary groups, political and civic leaders, and all interested citizens 
can use their own First Amendment freedoms to protest statements inconsis-
tent with standards of judicial neutrality and judicial excellence.  Indeed, if 
democracy is to fulfill its promise, they must do so.”53  Justice Stevens made 
the same point in dissent, adding that even official bodies like the defendant 
board in White “may surely advise the electorate that such announcements 
demonstrate the speaker’s unfitness for judicial office.  If the solution to 
harmful speech must be more speech, so be it.”54  
Today, thanks to the bar and the National Center for State Courts, at 
least seventeen states have campaign-conduct committees that protect the 
“culture” of judicial campaigns, including steps to “educate” candidates.  As 
recently stated in an Ohio decision sanctioning a candidate for violating Can-
ons about campaigning, “[It is] the responsibility of all judicial candidates to 
conduct their campaigns with the same degree of honesty, dignity and respect 
that, if elected, they would expect to receive from lawyers, litigants, and other 
members of the public.”55 
  
 50. Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of 
Judges and the Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 108-09 (2003). 
 51. Nate Ellis, ABA Recommends Public Funding of Judicial Races, Local 
Doubts Persist, DAILY REP. (Ohio), July 24, 2001 (quoting Justice Paul Pfeifer). 
 52. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 7, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 
08-22).  Florida’s twenty-year-old program, according to sympathetic observers, 
“needs to be reformed.”  CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN 
FINANCING IN FLORIDA: A PROGRAM SOURS 23 (2008). 
 53. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).    
 54. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 55. In re Beery, No. 2008-2235 (Ohio, Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www. 
sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-113.pdf.  Ohio, since 1995, requires 
(by court rule) candidates to attend sessions about campaign conduct early in the 
election cycle.  See Richard A. Dove, Judicial Campaign Conduct: Rules, Education, 
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d)  Disclosure of contributions to independent spending efforts: Contri-
butors to candidates, parties, and PACs are all disclosed, but in nearly all 
states disclosure of contributors to independent spending efforts is not re-
quired or the requirement applies only to “express advocacy.”56  This allows 
contributors to bypass the disclosure requirement by giving to organizations 
that use “issue ads,” despite their high likelihood (as usually intended) of 
impacting a pending campaign.  Whether it be to evade triggering recusal or 
to conceal from the voters the source of the funds, anyone seeking to avoid 
disclosure will contribute nothing or little to candidates, instead funding “is-
sue ad” efforts.  Supreme courts should promulgate a rule requiring parties 
and counsel in a lawsuit to certify that all their campaign contributions and 
expenditures with respect to the sitting judge’s campaign(s) within the past X 
years are set forth in an affidavit filed in that case.57 
e)  Voter guides: Improving voter awareness is at least as important as 
any other step.  The Chief Justices’ Summit, in 2000, issued a “Call To Ac-
tion” with twenty recommendations, including this: “State and local govern-
ments should prepare and disseminate judicial candidate voter guides.”58  
  
and Enforcement, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1456 (2001).  The “bible” about cam-
paign conduct committees is David Rottman, Conduct and Its Oversight in Judicial 
Elections: Can Friendly Persuasion Outperform the Power to Regulate?, 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1295 (2008); recent efforts are described in William Fortune & Penny 
J. White, Judicial Campaign Oversight Committees’ Complaint Handling in 2006 
Elections: Survey and Recommendations, 91 JUDICATURE 232 (2008).  A virtually 
sinful departure from all prior committees’ practice occurred in 2007 in Wisconsin, 
where the bar-established committee had a partisan majority and became embattled 
against one side of a supreme court campaign.  See David Callender, Accusations Fly 
in High Court Race, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wisc.), Feb. 21, 2008, at A1.  For cam-
paign conduct committees, credibility is crucial, and it depends on the committee’s 
balance.  
 56. See Clyde Wilcox, Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: 
Tracing the Tributaries of Campaign Finance, 4 ELECTION L.J. 371, 371-72 (2005). 
 57. For a draft rule or statute, see Roy Schotland, Proposed Legislation on Judi-
cial Election Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 133-36 (2003). 
 58. Nat’l Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, Call To Action, 34 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1353, 1357 (2001).  Voter guides, with information on candidates from the 
top of the ballot to the bottom, have been mailed to every registered voter for genera-
tions in California, Alaska, Oregon, and Washington and widely distributed in Utah.  
See Cynthia Canary, Know Before You Go: A Case for Publicly Funded Voters’ 
Guides, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 81, 84-85 (2003); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Cam-
paign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperors’ Clothes of American De-
mocracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 127 (1985).  The pamphlets are especially valuable for 
bottom-of-ballot candidates.  Several states now have fine online guides.  Canary, 
supra, at 84-85. 
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VII.  HONORING FIFTEEN CHIEF JUSTICES 
Let me close by honoring fifteen special chief justices.  A leading Italian 
political philosopher and public servant wrote of “the little nucleus of sound 
minds and choice spirits that keep mankind from going to the dogs every 
other generation . . . .”59  These chiefs belong in that “little nucleus.”     
Back in the 1970s, when I was a leading academic in the pension world 
and the only one interested in state and local pension funds, for almost a dec-
ade I addressed the state investment officers every year.  My third annual talk 
was about their funds’ accountability, which in practice meant the funds’ 
disclosure of their investment performance.  Many of the funds’ reports were 
classic fogs, utterly avoiding accountability, but a few were good to excellent.  
The most useful step was to commend best practices, so I started annual 
awards for good disclosure.  There is only one possible name for an award for 
good disclosure, and my Godiva Awards (of course in the form of some won-
derful chocolate) became a little legend among these massive investment 
funds and a few media.   
Although my awards to the following chief justices are for performance, 
not mere disclosure, may I continue calling them Godiva awards?60   
The chiefs’ accomplishments are matters of public record, so my few 
words here aim more personally.  One of America’s main maladies is the lack 
of regard, even disdain, with which we view public servants.  On one hand 
we have the destructive approach of the anti-government yahoos;61 on the 
  
 59. GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS 429 (Arthur Livingston ed., Hannah 
D. Kahn trans. 1939).   
 60. “Performance” is too narrow for what I am trying to say.  These people 
represent the best in public service and more; they are wonderful individuals.  One of 
the best ways to advance American public service would be for these people, and 
others like them, to spend time in high school classrooms; meeting such people may 
be life changing for some kids.  Among my own most important experiences were 
brief encounters with two state party chairmen (one Republican, one Democrat) and, 
during my first campaign (Oregon 1954, Democrat Richard L. Neuberger’s election to 
the U.S. Senate), coffee times with an old GOP leader.  How valuable judges can be 
in schools is pricelessly exemplified by Ohio’s Judge John Bender, who holds actual 
DUI hearings in high school auditoriums every spring just before the time for high 
school proms.  Shouldn’t that practice be copied everywhere? 
 61. Different from the yahoos but also radical are those who want judicial elec-
tions to be like other elections because  
Judges’ decisions make policy . . . . [they] – particularly appellate judges 
– exercise discretion in making those decisions . . . . [A] judge’s formula-
tion of the common law – and thus the content of the state’s public policy 
– [involves] essentially the same types of questions that a legislator con-
fronts, and the public has exactly the same interest in ensuring that the 
policy choices made are acceptable to the voters.   
Hearing on HCR 5005 & HR 2123 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2009 Leg. Sess. 
(Kan. 2009) (statement of Michael R. Dimino).  To ignore the differences between 
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other we have “reformers” who seek to improve government but too often try 
to make their case by attacking office holders’ integrity.62  
First, to an “ex-chief,” Judith Kaye of New York.  Her remarkable qual-
ity was captured for me by the response of other New York judges at one of 
their annual meetings, when I said how amazed I was by the warmth among 
them.  Over several days, each judge to whom I said that strikingly made the 
same response: “Oh, that’s because of Judith.”  
Next, Gerry Alexander of Washington state, who successfully protected 
public confidence in his court despite problematic conduct by some of his 
colleagues, and who in his last re-election beat one of the strongest, nastiest 
opposition campaigns we have suffered. 
Paul de Muniz of Oregon, who has turned court-legislature relations into 
an art and, as one part of that, recently produced the best-ever report on 
judges’ pay.  
Ron George of California, whose unfailing grace hides successes like 
his reorganization of the world’s largest judiciary.   
Dave Gilbertson of South Dakota, whose imagination, ability to build 
support, and sheer courage beat – by a landslide – a ballot proposition that 
was one of the most extreme attacks ever on American courts. 
Marilyn Kelly of Michigan, new as chief but experienced as a justice, 
who has what it takes to bring sorely needed unity to her court. 
Joe Lambert of Kentucky (an “ex-”), whose deft creativity saved his 
state from trouble in 2006 when its transition to implement a constitutional 
amendment required all but two of Kentucky’s 266 judges to stand for elec-
tion in that one year.  
Ruth McGregor of Arizona, who initiated, and still leads, a uniquely 
well-organized and effective program to strengthen public understanding of 
the role of the courts.  
  
“policy-making” by judges and by legislators is to jeopardize the rule of law in any 
country and to undermine the distinctive role of the judicial branch, a bedrock of 
America’s checks and balances.   
 62. An unusual example that created problems for Louisiana’s Supreme Court, 
consuming much time and energy but finally overcome, was a Tulane Law Review 
article attacking the justices’ campaign funding.  See Vernon Palmer & John Leven-
dis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of 
the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1291 
(2008).  Errors in that article were such that Tulane’s dean sent a formal letter of 
apology to the justices.  See Susan Finch, Tulane Law School Issues Apology to Loui-
siana Supreme Court, N. ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 16, 2008, at 1.  But before 
the article was published or even available to the justices, The New York Times re-
ported on it, and advocates urged the legislature to act.  See Adam Liptak, Looking 
Anew at Campaign Cash and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A14.  The 
Times never reported the apology except on NYTimes.com as an “Editor’s Note Ap-
pended,” Sept. 20, 2008.  
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Tom Moyer of Ohio, the nation’s senior CJ, who has constantly, inde-
fatigably advanced excellence in so many ways, while keeping up a daunting 
drive for needed changes.    
Ray Price and Michael Wolff of Missouri, whose silken political savvy 
and personal skills have preserved and advanced the caliber and inde-
pendence of the judiciary. 
Randy Shepard of Indiana, a model gentleman, model chief, and model 
ever-probing thinker. 
Jean Toal of South Carolina, an unprecedented combination of high 
energy, brilliance, leadership, and values. 
Jerry VandeWalle of North Dakota, the nation’s only CJ chosen by all 
judges in his state and who deservedly enjoys uniquely high regard and affec-
tion among the CJs.   
Last, another “ex-chief,” Tom Phillips of Texas, whom I have had the 
luck to work with and learn from for many years.  Appointed to a vacancy as 
CJ in 1988, when only thirty-eight, he was re-elected repeatedly and currently 
holds Texas’s record for judicial campaign fund-raising.  Yet, running his last 
campaign without contributions, he accomplished major changes (including 
the nation’s most sophisticated campaign finance regulation for judicial cam-
paigns), tried for still more, and continues to bring the Conference of CJs 
unfailing wisdom, wit, and leadership.   
I close with deepest appreciation to all who work to keep our state 
courts strong enough to assure justice. 
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